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The jurisdiction of all appellate courts ''shall be provided by statute/'3 Section 78-2-
2(3)(j) of the Utah Code, provides that: "The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction ..., 
over orders, judgments, and decrees of any court of record over which the Court of Appeals 
does not have original appellate jurisdiction^]"2 This is an appeal from the final judgment 
of the Third District Court in a civil matter, and although it has original appellate 
jurisdiction, the Supreme Court has transferred this matter to the Court of Appeals pursuant 
10 § /6--~-i^-) anu § /o--ici-3iz;uj, wiiiuii siamies provide tuai me oil;>rciiic LA)UH may 
transfer any matter over which it has original appellate jurisdiction. 
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1. Whether the award of attorney fees under Utah's Anti-SPAM Statute which 
was reduced to a fraction of what was incurred was an abuse of discretion of the lower 
court? 
2. Whether Plaintiff's rights to due process w7ere violated by the lower court's 
decision to award attorney fees based upon the decision of another case, without hearing, 
and without submission of an affidavit of attorney fees? 
Utah Const., Article VIIL § 5. 
Ut. Code Ann., § 78-2-2(3)0) (1953, as amended). 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This Court should review the legal conclusions of the trial court for correctness. 
"Generally, we review a trial court's legal conclusions for correctness, according the trial 
court no particular deference." Wilson Supply, Inc. v. Fradan Mfg. Corp., 2002 UT 94, P 11. 
54 P.3d 1177, 1181 (quoting Orton v. Carter 970 P.2d 1254, 1256 (Utah 1998)). 
nHVl l Q C^CMM't Q l l . O l l l H r P V I P W f " h ° f l p f * 1 Q i r * T l T r i H ^Xtmrr] r\-f o t t n r - n o ' T -fadr V \ \ r 11-, ^ l A U ? C i r ^ A ] v * f 
for an abuse of discretion. Turrle Management, Inc. v. Haggis Mavagemcm, Inc., 645 P.2d 
oo /, c /1 rJian J y^^;. 
This Court should review the statutory interpretations of the Third District Court for 
correctness. uWe review the district court's statutory interpretations for correctness/' Davis 
Counry Solid Waste Mgmt. v. City of Bountiful 2002 UT 60, P 9, 52 P.3d 1174. "We look 
first to the statute's plain language as evidence of the legislature's intent, and give effect to 
that plain language unless the statute is ambiguous." Id. at P 10. fc'We analyze the language 
of a statutory provision in light of other provisions within the same statute or act, and we 
attemot to harmonize the provisions in accordance with the legislative intent so as to give 
meaning to each provision."" Id. 
APPLICABLE RULES AND REGULATIONS TO APPEAL 
Rule 4-505U) Utah Rules of Judicial Administration. 
Rule 4-505.1 Utah Rules of Judicial Administration 
? 
S ' I A T K M J ^ N T O F T H E CASE 
Nature of the Case: 
This case involves the sending of unsolicited commercial email by Ediets.com. Inc. 
('Defendant/'A"opellee/Ediets.com) to Brittany Briner Hushes (Plaintiff/A'ODellant/Hushes), 
for which she brought an action in accordance with the Unsolicited Commercial and 
O C ^ U a i l V 1—.'A. U i l lw IL J _ y i l l C i i i /T>l~-L i U U i l U i l l <_' tCLJLi V_-\^ .'»-J. V~< : i l l i i U L a L C - U V >•,' X J ~' V J- V ± LU 1 J j O 1 U J 
(2002) (the "Statute"). This is a case of first impression. . 
Course of Proceedings arid Disposition Below: 
Hughes filed her action in the Third District Court, Sandy Division on September 5, 
2002 alleging thatEdiets.com sent or caused to be sent to Hughes an unsolicited commercial 
email in violation of the Statute, See Hughes Court Record (Ct. Rec.) p. 1-9. On February 
27, 2003, Defendant filed its answer. Ct. Rec. p, 10-14. On September 24 2003, 
Ediets.com filed a Confession of Judgment and Motion for Hearing to Determine 
Reasonable Attorneys5 Fees to Be Awarded Therein. See Ct. Rec. p. 68-72. 
On October 14. 2003, Judge Burton without hearing, and without submission of an 
affidavit of attorney fees, filed a decision on the determination of attorneys' fees. See Ct. 
Rec. p. 73-75. Judge Burton made an award of S885.00 for attorney fees reducing the 
attorney fees earned from $2,600.00. See Ct. Rec. p. 73-75. 
Plamuff filed hei Notice of Appeal Novembei 14. 2003 iCt. Rec. pp. 77) with the 
Utah Supreme Court which subsequently transfeiTed this matter to this Court on Januan 14, 
2004 (Ct. Rec. p. 78). 
Facts Established in the Record Below: 
1. On May 9. 2002 Brittany Briner Hughes received an unsolicited commercial 
email. See Ct. Rec. p. 4. 
2. The email sent by Edieis.com soiicjied products sold fur the benefit of 
Ediets.com, Inc. See Ct. Rec. p. 4-9. 
3. On September 24, 2003, Ediets.com, Inc. filed a Confession of Judgment and 
Motion for Hearing to Determine Reasonable Attorneys' Fees to be Awarded Therein. See 
Ct. Rec. p. 68-72. 
4. On October 14, 2003. before an affidavit had been filed on attorney's fees by 
the prevailing party, Honorable Judge Michael Burton of the Sandy Depailment of the Third 
District Court, based UDOII no affidavit oi submission tc the court, filed a decision awarding 
attorneys fees in the amount of $88: .00. See Ct. Rec. p. ID-"1 5. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. The Utah Unsolicited Commercially and Sexually Explicit Email Act ("Spam 
Act") provides for the award of a reasonable attorney fee for violations of that act. In this 
4 
case. Defendants confessed iudgment. entitling Plaintiff to an award of attorneys fees. No 
evidence of what the attorneys fees thai were earned was ever considered. Without any such 
submission, without hearing, or without any other evidence, the lower court issued a 
/ i ^ ^ i c - i r m f lW?rd i "n a n f l n r n A v c f o p c i n cm q m n u n t ThoT w i c ci c r m f i r*ont1v I ^ Q C rh f i n t lT 3 TPPQ ThpT 
\ _ i - < W > ^ A O l O l x C i V * Cli V j . l x i . i _ U L t U i i l W > J 1 U U U l i i UJLX U l i i U UJLAL L l i U I . T t C-4.LJ U J . _ i . l l X l W U i l L-L V 1 V U U H 1 i~*-J-X «-0-XW JL V W l»< t i l U l . 
were incurred. This was an abuse of discretion and a violation of Plaintiffs due process 
rights. 
ARGUMENT 
Although the Award of Attorney Feet vV&s Proper, h Wa> jNiudf Without 
L U C x i U M C I \ ^ U i I 3 I U ^ I a L l U l i XJ1 U V l U L l l w ^ , 
Plaintiff brought an action against Defendant for the violation ot Section 13-36-101. 
et seq.. of the Utah Code, which is more commonly known as the Utah Unsolicited 
Commercial and Sexually Explicit Email Act (the "Spam Act"). Utah Code Ann. § 13-36-
101, a seq. The Spam Act provides that ''each prevailing recipient o: email service provider 
shall be awarded costs and reasonable attorney fees/* Utah Code Ann. § 13-36-105(2)(b) 
(2002). In this case. Defendant filed a Confession of Judgment, admitting to violating the 
act, thereby acknowledging its duty to pay costs and a reasonable attorney fee. 
"Attorney fees are generally recoverable in Utah onh when authorized by statute or 
contract/" Prince i. Bear River Mut. Ins. Co., 2002 UT 68.152. 56 P.3d 524 (Utah 20021. 
When attorney fees are recoverable, the calculation of reasonable attorney fees is in the 
sound discretion of the trial court. Jenkins v. Bailey, 676 P.2d 391. 393 (Utah 1984). In 
this case, an award of attorney fees is provided by statute, and should be made in favor of 
5 
a prevailing recipient, which Plaintiff was, therefore the award of attorney fees was proper. 
The amount of the award, however took no evidence or affidavit into consideration when 
making it's award. That was an abuse of discretion. 
The Rules of Judicial Administration give some guidance as to the retirements to 
determine attorney fees. Rule 4-505 of the Utah Rules of Judicial Administration orovides 
"Affidavits in support of an award of attorney fees must he filed with the 
court and set forth specifically the legal basis for the award, tne nature oi the 
work performed by the attorney the number of hours spent LO piosecuie die 
r*. I r»-t -j-v-i \ r\ i n n r r i - n a n t r\ 1 K ^  T-n-rio o r - t o n r i -rv n i i r n i n r\ CT i m s> m n t l o " t/-\ t h e c t o n r A t o r 
» w i c L l l J l I'U j Ul»a;U±iJwi . lL, V_/ L I J ^ LXXXXw 0 ( J C / l l l XIX U U I O U X L I ^ LXX^ U i t ' L L ^ i I U tXJV~ a L U r c 1 WJ 
which attorney fees are claimed, and affirm the reasonableness of the fees for 
comparable legal services." 
Rule <4-505( 1) Utah Rules of Judicial Administration f emphasis added). 
In this case. Defendant's Confession of Judgment and Motion for Hearing to 
Determine Reasonable Attorneys* Fees to Be Awarded Therein, expressly requested that 
Pbimiff be required 'lo submit an affidavit setting forth the reasonable amount of attorneys' 
fees and eocls incurred m ihic matter [.]"' See Ct. Rec. p.69. 'The purpose of die requirement 
that an affidavit in support of an award of attorney fees state the legal basis for the award 
is to inform the court and opposing counsel of tae ground relied upon because fees are not 
routine]v awarded in every case and can be awarded onl} on certain narrow grounds.'' Hall 
V. NACM Internloumain, Inc.. 1999 UT 97, 988 P.2d 942 (Utah 1999;. Notwithstanding 
the requirement of Rule 4-505(1) nor the Defendant's request. Plaintiff was ne\er even 
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given an opportunity to submit the proper affidavits before the lower court made its a v. aid 
and ruling. This w7as an error by the lower court. 
The lower court based its decision on the decision Judge Burton had previously made 
in Amvx v. Columbia House Holdings, which carries a civil numbei of 020-1-13332, and was 
previously filed in the Sandy Department of the Third District Court. A copy of that 
decision is attached in the Addendum hereto as Addendum 3. Although that case wras also 
an action for violation of the Utah Spam Act. it was and remains a difierent case with 
different parties and different circumstance^. Nevertheless m hi^ Decision. Judge Burton 
states that "[t]he question of what is a reasonable attorney's fee in this type of case was the 
focus of a heaiing held before me on 15 September 2003 in the matter of Amvx v. Columbia 
House Holdings, which carries the civil number 020413332 here in tiie bancn Department." 
See Ct. Rec. p. 73. The problem witn that statement is thai the hearing referred to was not 
to determine a reasonable fee for that type of case, rather it was to determine a reasonable 
fee ior that particular case. It was error to make that assumption Judge Burton had no 
mechanism to weigh the Dixie }. Bracken factors, no evidence to support his conclusions, 
nor wTa , any effort made to even obtain such evidence. See Dixie State Bank •*. Bracken. "764 
P.2d985 (Utah 1988). 
Nowhere in the Spam Act does it provide for a "uniform fee" to be awarded for the 
violation of that act. Where a uniform fee has been established, that fee schedule has been 
established by the appropriate governmental body. See e.g. Rule 4-505.1 Utah Rules of 
Judicial Administration (setting fee schedule for attorneys in default judgment;. The 
language of the Spam Act only provides that costs and a reasonable attorney fee should be 
awarded to the prevailing recipient of a violating email. Nevertheless, that is what the lower 
court did. It simply awarded the fees it had awarded in another case, despite the lack of 
affidavit evidence and contrary to the requirements of the rules. 
The lower court also made inference that the amount of the fee should be reduced. 
or determined based upon the sramton recovery amount of $10.00. That also was in error. 
*Tn adaitioji. although the curioum in controversy can be a factor m 
determinin c a reasonable iees cait should be useci in outline much reliance on 
this factor. It is a simple fact in a lawyer's life that it takes about the same 
amount of time 10 collect a note in the amount of Si ,000 as 1! Lakes to coUect 
a note for $100,000. As sraajd in Cahiem: The
 Lota] amount of the attorneys 
fees awarded in this case cannot be said to be unreasonable just because it is 
greater than the amount recovered on the contract. The amount of the damages 
awarded in a cose does not place a necessary limit on the amount of attorneys 
fees that can be awarded/" 
i-J LJ^I L U. L ^ s \J V v/1 L.L..L -.h. V / U J / L J U ) . U u i o o n , KJ ^ *~r x —. v-x ^ —< — , \J —~ *J \<J lk~xx i. J u *J j ) . i i t v v^ -x Lxx w. I >w u o «, LXJL 
lower court did just that. 
2. Making the Award Without Notice vr Hearing or Opportunity iv Submit 
Affidavit, Violated Plaintiff's Rights of Due Process. 
In this case, decision of die amount of attorney fees was made without notice or 
opportunity to be heard. Althougn Defendants haa submitted their Motion icr 
Determination of Reasonable Attorney Fees, and requested that Plaintiffs be ordered to 
submit affidavits in support of their attorney fees, no such opportunity was ever granted. 
The lower court relied upon Amyx v. Columbia House Holdings, Inc. as previously 
S 
mentioned above. In that case, a similar motion was presented to the court, but instead ot 
the court making it's own determination, a minute entry was made and sent to all parties 
ordering Plaintiffs counsel to submit the appropriate affidavits. See copy of Docket 
attached as Addendum 4. The decision in that case was made on October 14. 2003 one full 
month after the hearing. See Addendum 4. That was the same date on which the award was 
made in this case, even though Plaintiff's motion was filed 011I3' twenty days prior. See Ct. 
Rec. p. 73. 
As the lower court relied upon the precedent set by Amy?;, Plaintiff should also be 
allowed to rely upon the precedent set by Judge Lindberg in that case when she sent out her 
Minute Entry requiring the attorney affidavits be submitted. There was never any 
opportunity to hearing, there was never any minute entry, there was never any opportunity 
to subuiit affidavit Tiie c\>urt haJ DO way to determine il the number of hours were the 
same in that case as they were in Amyx, or if the)7 were greater or even smaller. Due process 
requires that Plaintiff be given the opportunity to be heard at least in someway. That might 
have been satisfied eTv en through the ability to submit the affidavits, but it was not. 
"The fundamental requirement at due process is the opportunity to be hearci at d 
meaningful time and in a meaningful manner."" Kowalczyk v. INS. 245 F.5d 1143. 1147 
(10th Cir. 2001) (quoting Mathews v. Eldndgc A24L\S. 319, 333 (1976)): Jones v. Nuclear 
Pharm., Inc., 741 F.2d 322, 325 (10th Cir. 1984) ("The essence of procedural due process 
is that the parties be given notice and opportunity for a hearing."). 'The universal rule of 
9 
due process is fairnessf.]"" Jones. 741 r.2d at 325. Here theie "was nothing fan about it. It 
was simply a unilateral decision not based upon the merits or an}7 sort of evidence. It was 
error and the decision should be remanded for careful consideration of the attornev fees 
aciuanv earned m mar case. 
CONCLUSION 
Pursuant to the foregoing arguments and law, Appellant respectfully requests ihis 
Court remand this case back to the lower court for a proper review of the atiorney fees. 
DATED this day of April 2004. 
NELSON, S O T I / F E R , D; AHLE & POULSEN 
iSe^e?C7s^ffsr . Jr. 
Attorney for Appellant 
10 
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I hereby certify that I served two true and correct copies of the foregoing 
APPELLANTS' OPENING BRIEF ON APPEAL, via first class mail, postage prepaid. 
on the following. 
John A. Adams (#0023) 
N. Aaron Murdock (#8767; 
RAY. QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
36 South State Street. Suite 1400 
Salt Lake City. UT 84111 
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1. Decision. 
2. Utah Code Ann. ^ 13-36-101-105, The Utah Unsolicited Commercial and 
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Sandy Deparimeni. Case Number 020413332. 
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ADDENDUM 1 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SANDY DEPAF^^:^'Wy^P>°URT 
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®CT * 4 2003 
Brittany Briner Hughes, 
Plaintiff, DECISION 
"s r •
1 iv i 1 Ho . 0 2 ^ 4 0 9 5 ^ 0 
EDIETS.COM, Inc. and, 
and others, 
Defendants. 
Judge Burton 
This matter is before me to determine a reasonable 
attorney's fee to be awarded to the Plaintiff pursuant to the 
Defendant EDIETS.COM previously submitted Confession of Judgment. 
The Defendant seeks a hearing to establish the amount of the 
reasonable attorney's fee that must be awarded to Plaintiff 
pursuant to the governing statute. 
There is no need for a hearing on this issue 
The question of what is a reasonable attorney'" s fee in this 
type of case was the focus of a hearing held before me on 15 
September 2003 in. the matter of Amyx v. Columbia House Holdings, 
which carries the civil number 020413332 ' here in the Sandy 
Department. During the hearing and based upon the pleadings 
submitted by the parties, I was presented sufficient information 
that I reached the "Conclusion of Law" noted below. I aim quite 
certain that another hearing, again involving the recovery by 
Plaintiff of $10.00 in damages, would not increase my knowledge 
of what constitutes a reasonable attorney's fee and would not 
change my decision. As such, I reach the "Conclusion of Law" set 
forth below for the reasons previously stated in Amyx. 
CONCLUSION of LAW 
Having found that the Plaintiff's attorney should have spent 
3.2 5 hours at the rate of $150.00 per hour to successful J y 
prosecute this action; and 
Having found that the Plaintiff's paralegal spent 4.5 hours 
at the rate of $85.00 per hour to successfully prosecute this 
action; 
I would conclude that Plaintiff is entitled to an award of 
$885 00 as a reasonable attorney's fee in this case. 
The Plaintiff should now prepare for my signature such crder 
or judgment as he thinks will h^f effectuate this Decision. 
DATED 14 October 2003. 
I certify that a coj:y of the attached document was sent: to the 
following people ^** ~-*se o?0409f?? b* the method and on the date 
specified. 
Mail JOHN A ADAMS 
ATTORNEY DEF 
36 S STATE ST *\ - OC 
PO BOX 45385 
SALT LAKE CITY, 'C'Z 
84145-0385 
Mail DENVER C SNUFFER 
ATTORNEY PLA 
10885 SOUTH STATE STREiT 
SANDY UT 84 047 
!-r .... _ A Dated t h i s / . } _^  day of { ;/ I , 20 
-Deputy/C&urt Clerk? \ 
% , V \ . . '--^/ .0 
* jp^* ' 
I - a g e ' I :t: i | 
ADDENDf'M ' 
oo3 COMMERCE AND TRADE 13-36-103 
(5J whether the francmseeb of the same line-make in 
tha t relevant market area are providing adeauate service 
to consumers for the powersport vehicles of the line-make 
winch shall include the adequacy of the powersport vehi-
cle sale and service facilities equipment, supply of vehicle 
parts and qualified service personnel 2002 
13-35-307. F r a n c h i s o r s r e p u r c h a s e obl igat ions upon 
t e r m i n a t i o n or n o n c o n t i n u a t i o n of f r anch i se . 
(I) Upon the termination or noncontinuation of a franchise 
b^r the francnisor the franchisor shall pay the franchisee 
ta) the franchisee s cost of new undamaged, and unsold 
powersport vehicles in the franchisee's nrrentor<r acquired 
from the franchisor or another franchisee of the same 
line-make representing both the current model year a^  
the time of termination or noncontinuation and the nn 
mediately prior model year vehicles 
li) plus any charges made by the rrancnisoi Toi 
distribution, delivery, or taxes, 
(II) plus the franchisees cost of any accessories 
added on the vehicle shall be repurchased, and 
(III) less all allowances paid or credited to ilit 
franchisee by the franchisor 
(b) the cost of all new, undamaged, and unsola ^up 
plies, parts, and accessories as set forth m tne tranchisor s 
catalog at the time of termination or noncontinuation for 
the supplies, par ts , «nd accessories, less all allowance^ 
paid or credited to the franchisee by the franchisor, 
(c) the fair market value, but not less than the Franchi-
see's depreciated acquisition cost of each undamaged sign 
owned by the franchisee that bears a common name trade 
name, or t rademark of the franchisor if acquisition 01 the 
sign wras recommended or 1 equired by the franchisor If a 
franchisee has a sign with multiple manufacturers listed, 
the franchisor is only responsible for its pro ra ta portion of 
the sign 
(d) the fair market value but not less than tne fran-
chisees depreciated acquisition cost of all special tools, 
equipment, and furnishings acquired from the franchisor 
or sources approved bv the franchisor that were recom-
mended or required bv the franchisor and are m good and 
usable condition, and 
(e) the cost of transporting, handling packing and 
loading powersport vehicles, supplies, parts, accessories 
signs, special tools, equipment and furnishings 
(2) The franchisor shall pay the franchisee the amounts 
specified m Subsection (1) within 90 davs after the tender of 
the property to the franchisor if the franchisee 
(a) has clear title to the property, and 
<b) is in a position to conve}^ title to the franchisor 
(3) If repurchased inventory and equipment are sub]ect to a 
security interest the franchisor may make payment jointly to 
the tfancmsee and to the holder of the security interest 2002 
C1IAPTEK 36 
UNSOLICITED COMMERCIAL AND SEXUALLY 
EXPLICIT EMAIL ACT 
Section 
13-36-101 
13-36-102 
13-36-103 
13-36-104 
13-36-105 
Title 
Definitions 
Unsolicited commercial or sexuall} explicit 
email — Requirements 
Criminal penalty 
< ivil action for violation — Election on dam-
ages — Costs and attorney fees — Defense. 
13-36-101. Title. 
This chapter is known as the Unsolicited Commercial and 
Sexually Explicit Email Act ' 2002 
13- '16-102. Defini t ions 
^ used m this chapter 
(1 ^Commercial' means for tne parpose of promoting 
the sale lease or exchange of goods services or leal 
property 
(2) "Computer network' means two or more computers 
that are interconnected to exchange electronic messages 
files, data, or other information 
(3) "Email" means an electronic message file data 01 
other information that is transmitted 
(a) between two or more computers nmmnvi IK t 
works or electronic terminals oi 
(b) within a computer network 
4^ "Email address" means a destination, commonly 
expressed as a string of chaiacterc to which email ma1 be 
sent or delivered 
(5) 'Email service provider means a person that 
t a i is an intermediary m the transmission of email 
from the sender to the recipient or 
lb) provides to end users of email service tne 
ability to send and receive email 
(6* "Internet domain name" means a globalh unique 
hierarchical reierence to an Internet host or service, 
assigned through centralized Internet authorities com-
prising a series of character strings separated bv periods, 
with the right-most string specifying the top of the nier-
'rcfr* 
(7J ta) 'Sexualh explicit email means an email that 
contains promotes or contains an electronic link to 
material that is harmful to minors as defined m 
Section 76-10-1201 
(bj An email is a sexually explicit email' if it 
meets the definition in Subsection (7)(aJ, even if the 
email also meets the definition of a commercial email 
(8) (a) "Unsolicited" means without the recipient's ex-
press permission except as piovided m Subsection 
(8Kb} 
<bj A commeiciai email is not 'unsolicited" if the 
sender has a preexisting business or personal rela-
tionship with the reciment 2002 
LV3(>-103. Unsol ic i ted commercial 01 sevuii lh e x p h r i i 
ema i l — R e q u i r e m e n t s . 
ll) Each person who sends or causes to be sent an unsolic 
ited commercial email or an unsolicited sexually explicit email 
through the intermediary of an email service provider located 
m the state or to an email address held bv a resident of the 
state shall 
(aj conspicuously state m the email tiic senders 
u) legal name, 
tn) correct street address ind 
(111) valid Internet domain name 
(b) include m the email a subiect line that contains 
ti) for a commercial email A D V as tne first lour 
characters, or 
(11) for a sexually explicit email AB\ AJ)VLT ds 
the first nine characters 
(c) provide the recipient a convenient, no-cost mecha-
nism to notify the sender not to send any future email to 
the recipient, including 
(1; return email to a irahcl runctionme return elec-
tronic address, and 
'11) for a sexualh explicit email and if the sendei 
has a toll-free telephone numuei the senders toll 
free telephone number and 
(d) conspicuously provide m the text of thp email a 
notice that 
(1) informs the recipient that the recipient may 
conveniently and at no cost be excluded from future 
iy-36-104 COMMERCE AND TRADE 564 
commercial or sexually explicit email as the case 
may be, from the sender, and 
In) for a sexually explicit email and if the sender 
has a toll-free telephone number includes the send-
er's valid, toll-free telephone number that the recipi-
ent may call to be excluded from ruture email from 
the sender 
(2) A person who sends or causes to be sent an unsolicited 
commercial email or an unsolicited sexually explicit email 
thi ough the intermediary of an email service provider located 
in the state or to an email address held by i resident of the 
state may not 
(a^ use a third party s Internet domain name m identi-
fying the point of origin or m stating the transmission 
path of the email without the third party s consent, 
(bj misrepresent anv information in identifying the 
point of origin or the transmission path of the email oi 
(c) fail to include in the email the information neces-
sary to identify tne point ot origin of the email 
(3) If the recipient of an unsolicited commercial email or an 
unsolicited sexualfy explicit email notifies the sender that the 
recipient does not want to receive ruture commercial email or 
future sexually explicit email, respectively, from the sender 
the sender may not send tha t recipient a commercial email or 
a •seiuaih explicit email, a^ the case may be either directly oi 
tnrough a subsidiary or affiliate MWJ* 
10-36-104 C r i m m a l pena l t \ 
(1) A person who violates any requirement of Section 13 
36-103 with respect to an unsolicited sexually explicit email 1* 
guilty of a class B misdemeanor 
(2) A criminal conviction or a penalty assessed as a. lesult oi 
a criminal conviction under Subsection (1) does not relieve the 
person convicted or assessed from civil liability in an action 
under Section 13-36-105 2002 
13-36-105. Civil a c t i o n ioi \10Iat10n — Election on 
d a m a g e s — Cos ts a n d at torney tees — De-
fense. 
(1) F02 a m violation of a provision of Section 13-36-103, an 
artion may be brought by 
(aJ a person who received the unsolicited commercial 
email or unsolicited sexually explicit email with respect to 
which the violation under Section 13-36-103 occurred or 
(bj an email service provider through whose facilities 
the unsolicited commercial email or unsolicited sexually 
explicit email was transmitted 
(2) In each action under Subsection Q) 
(a) a recipient or email service pro^ idei ma\ 
(I) recover actual damages, or 
(II) elect 111 lieu of actual uamaCTcro ic rteo^e* H±* 
lesser of 
(A) $10 per unsolicited commeicial email or 
unsolicited sexually explicit email leceived by 
the recipient or transmitted through the email 
service provider, or 
(B) $25 000 pei dav that the violation occuiu 
ana 
(h) each prevailing recipient or email sen ice provide' 
shall be awarded costs and reasonable attorney fees 
(3) An email service provider does not violate Section 13-
36-103 solely bv being an intermediary between the sender 
and recipient m tne transmission of an email that violates 
that section 
(4) The violation of Section 13-36-103 by an emplo}^ee does 
not subject the employees employer to liability under that 
section if the employee's violation of Section 13-36-103 is also 
a violation of an established policy of the employer that 
reauire-. compliance with the reauirements of Section 13-36-
103 
5; It is 1 deiense to m action brou^hi unae r this section 
that the unsolicited commercial email or unsolicited sexualh 
explicit email was transmitted accidentally -SOOL 
CHATTER 37 
NOTICE OF UN TENT TO SELL NONPUBLIC 
PERSONAL INFORMATION ACT [EFFECTIAT 
JANUARY U 2004] 
P a r t j 
U e n e r a l Provis ions [Effective J a n u a r y 1, 2004., 
Section 
13-37-101 Title [Effective January 1 2004] 
13-37-102 Definitions [Effective January 1, 2004] 
P a n 2 
Notice oi Disc losure [Effective J a n u a r y 1, 20041 
13-3^-201 Keauired notice [Effective January 1 2004] 
13-37-202 Disclosure of nonpublic personal information 
prohibited without notice [Effective j a n u a i \ 
1, 2004] 
13 37 203 Liability [Effective JJULUCH \ 1 2001] 
PART 1 
GENERAL PROVISIONS [EFFECTIVE JANUARY 1, 
2004] 
13-37-101. Title [Effective January 1, 2004]. 
Tins chapter is known as the "iNotice of Intent to Sell 
1 Nonpublic personal Intormation n.U ' >wt 
13-37-102. Definit ions [Effective J a n u a r y 1, 2001 ' 
i£ used in this chapter 
11) "Affiliate" means a person that controls is -on-
trolled by, or is under common control with 
(a) a commercial entity and 
(b) (1) directly or 
(11) indi rec t^ through one or more intermedi-
aries 
(2) (a) Subject to Subsection (2Kb) commeiciai en-
tity means a person that 
ti) has an office or other place of business 
located m the state, ana 
(11) in the ordinary course of business trans-
acts a consumer transaction in this state 
(b) "Commercial entitv does not memae 
(I) a governmental entity 01 
(II) an entitv providing services on behalf of a 
governmental entity 
3) "Compensation' means anything of economic value 
that is paid or transferred to a commercial entit\ for or m 
direct consideration of the disclosure 01 nommbhc pei-
sonal intormation 
4) (a) "Consumer transaction'1 means 
(1^1 a sale, lease, assignment, award h\ chance, 
or other written or oral transfer or disposition 
(A) that is initiated or completed in tins 
state, and 
(B) or 
(D goods 
tlli services or 
(III) other tangible 01 intangible 
propert}^ except securities and insur-
ance or services related thereto or 
ADDENDUM 
THIRD D I S T R I C T COURT, SANDY DEPARTMENT ^ * ^ W ^ . 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
<a?~ 
' # / 
V 
Frank Amyx, 
P l a i n t i f f , DECISION 
v . Civil No. 020413332 
Columbia House Holdings, 
and others. 
Defendants. 
Inc . , Judge Burton 
This matter is before me to determine a reasonable 
attorney's fee to be awarded to the Plaintiff pursuant to the 
Defendant Columbia House Holdings previously approved Confession 
of Judgment. Each party has fully briefed the matter and was 
able to share with me their respective positions ai a hearing on 
15 September 2003. 
The question of what is a reasonable attorney's fee has been 
the focus of quite a bit of the effort of these attorneys. I 
can't recall a time when I have seen such disparate positions 
taken by lawyers as they discuss what value should be placed on 
their work product. The Plaintiff's first volley was a simple 
five page affidavit which fixed the reasonable attorney's fee at 
about $2,600.00 for the obtaining of a $10.00 result. The 
Defendant replied with objections covering eleven pages, their 
own affidavit, a few exhibits and the assertion that a reasonable 
attorney's fee for obtaining a $10.00 award was $150.00. Not 
wanting to be unclear on the differences they had with the 
position presented by the Defendant, the Plaintiff prepared a 
modest reply to objections that covered just eight pages, but 
supplemented that with enough exhibits and additional claims that 
the packet of pleadings weighed more than a pound and a half and 
increased the claimed amount of attorney's and paralegal fees to 
a little over $4,000.00. So, the finder of fact was left to 
decide which was more reasonable, $4,000.00 or $150.00. The gap 
between the two positions is enormous, all with respect to a 
recovery of $10.00. 
FACTUAL DIFFICULTIES 
Each party has presented me with factual problems that 
simply fail to stand up to the most basic scrutiny. 
The Plaintiff asserts that: 
[1] 1.5 hours was devoted to "spam research". That is a 
problem because there have been at least 70 0, and perhaps as many 
as 1200, cases of this exact type filed by the Plaintiff. If 
there were only 700 similar cases, an hour and half attributed to 
this case for spam research seems to mean that a total of 1050 
hours were spent doing research for all 70 0 of these cases. 
That equates to just over 13 0 eight hour days or about four and 
three-eighths months of research. If tnere were 1200 such cases 
filed, the effort then consumed 225 days or seven and one-half 
months. I don't believe that happened. 
[2] 1.6 hours were spent in client meetings. The Plaintiff 
touts this as being u...very concise and itemized." The 
necessity of this amount of time is then explained in the 
Plaintiff's affidavit. The problem occurs when it is discovered 
that this particular Plaintiff has filed more than fifty of these 
cases. If believed, this client needed about eighty hours, or 
ten, eight hour, days, to sign agreements, have questions 
answered, be helped to understand matters and be kept informed. 
Again, I don't believe that happened to the extent of 1.6 hours 
for each of this Plaintiff's fifty cases. 
The Defendant postulates that the guiding principle in 
fixing the reasonable attorney's fee should be the schedule used 
for awarding attorney's fees in cases where a defendant allows a 
plaintiff to obtain a default judgment. That position is flawed 
because everyone in this contest agrees that, though Defendant 
eventually confessed to a judgment, much more was involved in 
reaching that point than the mere filing of a complaint, serving 
a summons and obtaining a judgment as would be expected in a 
simple default case. The Defendant seems to want to expend 
attorney's fees in finding a possible defense and, when none is 
found, pretend that the opposing party ought not to expect to 
recover fees devoted to countering the Defendant's possible 
defenses. I don't believe that is how this case should be 
viewed. 
In sum, the parties positions are so wildly disparate and 
their assertions as to time involved are so lacking in 
credibility that I am left with many factual difficulties and 
without any helpful guidance on fixing a reasonable attorney's 
fee . 
APPLICABLE LAW 
It seems to me that the most favored approach to fixing a 
reasonable attorney's fee was "born" in Dixie Staze Bank v. 
Bracken. The four-step analysis set forth in that case is the 
framework I will apply to reach a decision on the issue. 
FINDINGS of FACT 
What legal work was actually performed? 
a - spam research, attributable to this particular case, 
would likely have taken .2 hour 
b - attorney meetings and case analysis, attributable to 
this particular case, would likely have taken .5 hour 
c - initial correspondence with Defendant: on this case would 
have taken .3 hour 
d - client meetings and communication, as it relates to this 
case, should not have exceeded .2 hour 
e - business entity research would have taken .7 hour 
f - drafting complaint and summons in this case should not 
have exceeded .4 hour 
g - file review in this case should not have exceeded .2 
hour 
h - review of confession of judgment - .25 hour 
i - draft affidavit of attorney fees and costs - .6 hour 
j - business entity research by paralegal - 1.9 hours 
k - prepare final summons and complaint by paralegal - .8 
hour 
1 - database entry and maintenance by paralegal - 1.2 hours 
m - prepare, finalize and file attorney's fee affidavit by 
paralegal - .6 hour 
How much of the work performed was reasonably necessary to 
prosecute the matter? 
There are additional and different hours claimed for work 
done on this case in the several affidavits filed by Plaintiff. 
Any of the hours claimed in the affidavits and not noted above 
were, to my thinking, not necessary for the successful 
prosecution of this matter. 
Is the attorney's billing rate consistent with the rates 
customarily charged in the locality for similar services? 
The Plaintiff's attorneys fix their hourly rate at $250.00. 
They assert that their experience and the fact that they 
regularly charge a similar hourly rate justify such an amount. 
My observation, after over twenty years of reviewing affidavits 
for attorney's fees, is that an hourly rate of $150.00 is much 
more consistent with the rates charged in this locality by other 
attorneys for similar services. Thus, the rate charged by these 
attorneys is not consistent with rates customarily charged for 
similar services in this locality. An hourly rate of $150.00 is 
consistent. 
I have no experience with the rates attorneys in this 
locality charge for the services of their paralegal. The rate of 
$85.00 per hour set forth by Plaintiff seems reasonable. 
Are there circumstances which require consideration of 
additional factors? This case, because of the large number of 
essentially identical cases filed by the same attorneys, became 
routine m its nature and posed no significant legal issues at 
tne time tms case was filed and brougnt to conclusion So much 
of eact of the parties' efforts seem focused on inflation or 
deflation of the attorney's fee component of this case. 
CONCLUSION of LAW 
Having found that the Plaintiff's attorney should have spent 
3 25 nours at the rate of 5150 00 per hour to successfully 
prosecute this action; and 
Having found that the Plaintiff's paralegal spent 4.5 ncurs 
at tne rate of $85.00 per hour to successfully prosecute this 
action; 
I would conclude that Plaintiff is entitled to an award of 
$885 00 as a reasonable attorney's fee in this case. 
The Plaintiff should now prepare for my signature such crder 
or judgment as he thinks will Dest effectuate this Decision. 
DATED 14 October 2 003 
CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION 
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the 
following people for case 02 0413 3 32 by the method and on the date 
specified. 
METHOD NAME 
Mail RANDY L DRYER 
ATTORNEY DEF 
2 01 SOUTH MAIN, SUITE 18 0 0 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 8 414 5 
Mail JESSE L RIDDLE 
ATTORNEY PLA 
P.O. BOX 1187 
SANDY UT 84 091 
Mail DENVER C SNUFFER 
ATTORNEY PLA 
10885 SOUTH STATE STREET 
SANDY UT 84 047 
<^ r \ ^ - -x 
Dated rhis S d aY o f U^ / 2 0 Q-3 . 
DeDUtv Court Cleric % 
fc 
^ 
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ADDENDUM 4 
Defendant - THE COLUMBIA HOUSE COMPANY 
New York, NY 10020-2200 
Represented by: RANDY L DRYER 
Doing Business As - COLUMBIAHOUSECOM 
Represented by: RANDY L DRYER 
Defendant - JOHN DOES 
ACCOUNT SUMMARY 
440.00 TOTAL REVENUE Amount Due 
Amount Paid: 
Credit: 
Balance: 
BAIL/CASH BONDS 
Applied: 
Forfeited: 
Balance: 
440.00 
0.00 
0.00 
Posted: 
0.00 
0.00 
300.00 
300.00 
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: COMPLAINT 0K-2K 
Amount Due: 45.00 
Amount Paid: 45.00 
Amount Credit: 0.00 
Balance: 0.00 
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: APPEAL 
Printed: 04/01/04 11:43:07 Page 1 
AL 
CASE NUMBER 020413332 Unsolicited Communi. 
Amount Due: 205.00 
Amount Paid: 205.00 
Amount Credit: 0.00 
Balance: 0.00 
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: APPEAL 
Amount Due: 190.00 
Amount Paid: 
Amount Credit: 
Balance: 
ian on 
X S \J .\J\J 0.00 
0.00 
BAIL/CASH BOND DETAIL - TYPE: CASH BOND: Civil, Mi 
Posted By: PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER 
Posted: 
Forfeited: 
Refunded: 
Balance: 
300.00 
0.00 
0.00 
300.00 
CASE NOTE 
PROCEEDINGS 
07-25-02 Filed: Motion for Extention of Time to File Attorneys' Fees 
Affidavit 
11-22-02 Case filed by deem 
11-26-02 Judge LINDBERG assigned. 
11-27-02 Filed: Complaint 0-2K 
11-27-02 Fee Account created Total Due: 45.00 
11-27-02 COMPLAINT 0K-2K Payment Received: 45.00 
Note: Code Description: COMPLAINT 0K-2K 
02-24-03 Filed: Answer by ATD Randy L Dryer 
COLUMBIA HOUSE HOLDINGS INC 
COLUMBIAHOUSECOM 
06-20-03 SCHEDULING CONFERENCE scheduled on July 16, 2003 at 09:30 AM in 
Second Floor with Judge LINDBERG. 
06-20-03 Notice - NOTICE for Case 020413332 TD 5643917 
SCHEDULING CONFERENCE is scheduled. 
Date: 07/16/2003 
Time: 09:30 a.m. 
Location: Second Floor 
SANDY DISTRICT COURT 
210 West 10000 South 
SANDY, UT 84070 
Before Judge: DENISE P. LINDBERG 
This hearing is set as a case management conference to discuss the 
most effective sequence for scheduling pending motions and moving 
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the cases forward. All lead attorneys for identified spam cases 
are requested to be present. 
07-09-03 Filed: Notice of Confession of Judgment and Motion for Hearing 
to Determine Reasonable Attorneys' Fees to be Awarded Therein. 
07-09-03 Note: RECEIVED: Judgment 
07-09-03 Note: File to judge's clerk to set hearing date 
07-09-03 SCHEDULING CONFERENCE Cancelled. 
Reason: Confession of Judgment filed. 
07-14-03 Minute Entry - DEFENDANT'S CONFESSION OF JUDGMENT 
Judge: DENISE P. LJNDBERG 
Clerk: loris 
The Defendant's Confession of Judgment is GRANTED. Judgment to 
enter as reflected in the Confession of Judgment: $10.00 in 
statutory damages, $45.00 in court costs, and reasonable attorneys 
fees as determined by the court. Plaintiffs counsel to submit an 
affidavit in support of their attorneys fees request; the court 
reserves the right to schedule a hearing on the issue as it may 
deem necessary. The attorneys fee affidavit to be submitted to the 
court within 10 days. 
Judge DENISE P. LJNDBERG 
07-14-03 Judgment #1 Entered 
Debtor COLUMBIA HOUSE HOLDINGS INC 
Debtor: COLUMBIAHOUSECOM 
Debtor: THE COLUMBIA HOUSE COMPANY 
Creditor: FRANK AMYX 
10.00 Principal 
45.00 Costs 
55.00 Judgment Grand Total 
07-14-03 Filed judgment: Judgment by Confession 
Judge dlindber 
Signed July 14, 2003 
07-14-03 Case Disposition is Judgment loris 
Disposition Judge is DENISE P. LINDBERG loris 
07-25-03 Filed: Motion for Extention of Time to File Attorneys' Fees 
Affidavit 
07-29-03 Filed: Affidavit of Attorneys' Fees and Costs 
08-01-03 Note: File submitted to Judge to review. Wrong case number was 
on paper work correct number was found and resubmitted. 
08-04-03 Filed: Minute Entry Following the Scheduling Conference of July 
16, 2003 (see file) 
08-04-03 Minute Entry - MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES 
Judge: DENISE P. LINDBERG 
Clerk: loris 
Set for hearing on the reasonableness of the fees requested. 
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08-05-03 Notice - NOTICE for Case 020413332 ID 5685267 
MOTION HEARING ON ATT FEES is scheduled. 
Date: 11/24/2003 
Time: 10:00 a.m. 
Location: Second Floor 
SANDY DISTRICT COURT 
210 West 10000 South 
SANDY, UT 84070 
Before Judge: DENISE P. LINDBERG 
08-07-03 Filed: Memorandum (1) Objection to the affidavit of fees and 
costs submitted by plaintiffs counsel (2) Requesting an Order 
approving a fee award of $150 or, (3) Alternatively requesting 
an evidentiary hrg on the issue of reasonable attorneys fees. 
08-13-03 Notice - NOTICE for Case 020413332 ID 5694306 
MOTION HEARING ON ATT FEES. 
Date: 09/15/2003 
Time: 10:00 a.m. 
Location: Second Floor 
SANDY DISTRICT COURT 
210 West 10000 South 
SANDY, UT 84070 
Before Judge: DENISE P. LINDBERG 
The reason for the change is Court Ordered 
No tank tops, crop tops, shorts or hats allowed in the courtroom. 
Shoes must be worn. 
08-13-03 MOTION HEARING ON ATT FEES scheduled on September 15, 2003 at 
10:00 AM in Second Floor with Judge LINDBERG. 
08-14-03 Filed: Withdrawal of Request for Class Certification 
08-26-03 Filed: Order Striking Class Allegations-unsigned/Pla filed 
Withdrawal of Request for Class Certification 
09-12-03 Filed: Plaintiffs Reply to Defendant's Memorandum Objecting to 
the Affidavit of Fees and Costs Submittted by Plaintiffs 
09-12-03 Filed: AFFIDAVIT OF DENVER C. SNUFFER, JR. FOR ATTORNEYS' FEES. 
09-12-03 Filed: AFFIDAVIT OF ATTORNEYS' FEES OF JESSE RIDDLE. 
09-12-03 Filed: AFFIDAIVT OF ATTORNEYS' FEES OF DANNY FRAZIER. 
09-12-03 Filed: LETTER FROM PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER. 
09-12-03 Filed: AFFIDAVIT OF PARALEGAL FEES. 
09-12-03 Filed: INDEX OF PLEADINGS. 
09-15-03 Minute Entry - Minutes for MOTION HEARING ON ATT FEES 
Judge: MICHAEL K. BURTON 
Clerk: vickielc 
PRESENT 
Plaintiff's Attorney(s): DENVER C SNUFFER 
JESSE L RJDDLE 
Defendant's Attorney(s): RANDY L DRYER 
Audio 
Tape Number: 03-258 Tape Count: 1509 
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HEARING 
MR. SNUFFER ADDRESSES THE COURT. 
MR. DRYER ADDRESSES THE COURT. 
MR. RIDDLE ADDRESSES THE COURT. 
MR. DRYERS ADDRESSES THE COURT. 
THE COURT TAKES THIS MATTER UNDERADVISEMENT. 
09-23-03 Filed: Objection to Defendant's Motion Striking Class 
Allegations 
10-14-03 Filed: Decision (see file) 
11-14-03 Filed: Notice of Appeal 
11-14-03 Fee Account created Total Due: 205.00 
11-14-03 APPEAL Payment Received: 205.00 
Note: Code Description: APPEAL 
11-14-03 Note: File to judge to sign Judgment 
11-18-03 Judgment #2 Entered 
Debtor COLUMBIA HOUSE HOLDINGS PNC 
Creditor: FRANK AMYX 
940.00 Total Judgment 
940.00 Judgment Grand Total 
11-18-03 Filed judgment: Judgment on Pleading 
Judge mburton 
Signed November 17, 2003 
11-19-03 Note: CERTIFIED COPY OF NOTICE OF APPEAL MAILED TO THE UTAH 
SUPREME COURT. 
11-26-03 Filed: NOTICE OF CROSS-APPEAL BY RANDY L DRYER, ATD. 
11-26-03 Filed: LETTER FROM THE SUPREME COURT THE CASE NUMBER IS 
20030950-SC. 
11-28-03 Filed: Notice of Counter-Appeal (Incomplete Payment-should be 
$205) 
11-28-03 Fee Account created Total Due: 190.00 
11-28-03 APPEAL Payment Received: 190.00 
Note: Code Description: APPEAL; Mail Payment; 
11-28-03 Bond Account created Total Due: 300.00 
11-28-03 Bond Posted Payment Received: 300.00 
Note: Mail Payment; 
12-01-03 Note: CERTIFIED COPY OF NOTICE OF CROSS-APPEAL MAILED TO THE 
SUPREME COURT. 
12-16-03 Filed: LETTER FROM THE SUPREME COURT, NOTICE OF CROSS-APPEAL IN 
THIS CASE HAS BEEN FILED. THE CASE NUMBER IS 20030950-SC. 
02-04-04 Filed: ORDER FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF UTAH THIS MATTER IS 
TRANSFERRED TO THE COURT OF APPEALS THE CASE NUMBER WELL 
REMAIN 
THE SAME. 
02-05-04 Filed: LETTER FROM THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS THE CASE NUMBER 
20030950-CA. 
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